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MADISON AND THE MENTALLY ILL: THE DEATH 
PENALTY FOR THE WEAK, NOT THE WORST  
Corinna Barrett Lain*† 
INTRODUCTION 
Regent’s symposium on mental health and the law offers an 
opportunity to pause and think about a particularly acute issue within 
that larger framework: the treatment of those with severe mental illness1 
in our capital justice system. A case currently pending before the United 
States Supreme Court, Madison v. Alabama,2 is an apt place to start, as 
the Court just heard oral arguments in early October.3 The question in 
Madison is whether the condemned inmate is competent to be executed.4 
I will begin by telling you a bit about the facts of Madison, and then I will 
use the case to launch a larger discussion about how the severely mentally 
ill get caught in the capital justice system and why that is a problem.  
Vernon Madison was sentenced to death for killing a police officer 
back in 1985, and has now spent over 30 years on death row.5 Why so long, 
you ask.  The answer is reversible error.  First, Madison’s conviction was 
                                                     
*  S.D. Roberts and Sandra Moore Professor of Law, University of Richmond School 
of Law. I thank the Regent Law Review for inviting me to give this address and for its hard 
work in publishing my remarks. I also thank MaryAnn Grover for her invaluable research 
assistance, and Erin Collins, Jessica Erickson, Jim Gibson, Michael Meltsner, Luke Norris, 
Scott Sundby, and Allison Tate for their helpful comments and suggestions along the way. 
†  The following are remarks from the keynote speech given at Regent University’s 
31st Annual Law Review Symposium on mental health and the law, on November 2, 2018. 
For a full schedule of symposium panels and events, see https://www.regent.edu/ 
app/uploads/sites/3/2018/10/Regent-University-Law-Review-Symposium-Schedule-2018.pdf. 
1  Some use the term “serious mental illness,” while others use the term “severe 
mental illness.” These terms tend to be used interchangeably, but given that all mental 
illness is serious, while only a discreet subset is severe, I use the latter term here. See 
generally Kenneth T. Kinter, What’s in a Name: “Serious”, “Severe”, and “Severe and 
Persistent”, 21 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. REHABILITATION 52–54 (2017), https://www. 
psychosocial.com/IJPR_21/What_is_in_a_Name_Kinter.html (differentiating serious mental 
illness from severe mental illness and explaining that severe mental illness is a subset of 
serious mental illnesses). For further discussion on what the term “severe mental illness” 
entails, see infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
2  See 138 S. Ct. 1172, 1172 (2018) (granting Madison’s petition for writ of certiorari). 
See Editor’s note on Madison, which was decided February 27, 2019, at the end of this essay. 
3  Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. argued 
Oct. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Oral Argument]. 
4  See 17-7505 Madison v. Alabama Question Presented, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. 
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-07505qp.pdf (summarizing one issue in 
Madison as whether the State can legally execute “a prisoner whose mental disability leaves 
him without memory of his commission of the capital offense”). 
5  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 4, Madison, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed Jan. 18, 
2018) [hereinafter Petition]. 
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overturned because prosecutors unconstitutionally excluded black jurors 
from his trial.6 Then on retrial, it was overturned because the prosecution 
put on expert testimony in the case that was so obviously inadmissible 
that it constituted plain error.7 At Madison’s third trial, the jury actually 
recommended life, but Alabama was one of very few states that allowed a 
judge to override a jury’s recommended sentence,8 and that is exactly what 
the judge in Madison’s case did: he overrode the jury’s recommendation of 
life and imposed a death sentence instead.9 
Suffice it to say that for Madison, it has been a long road. But here 
we are, over 30 years later. Madison is now 68 years old and has had a 
series of strokes, two of them nearly fatal, which have left him with 
permanent brain damage and a condition called Vascular Dementia, a 
cerebral vascular disorder that is degenerative, so it is progressively 
getting worse.10 On MRIs, you can actually see the areas of Madison’s 
brain where the tissue is dead, and when you compare multiple MRIs over 
the years, you can see that the area of dead tissue in his brain is growing.11  
Madison’s disorder has manifested itself in a number of ways. He has 
suffered an IQ loss over the years that now puts him in the borderline 
range of intellectual functioning.12 He slurs his speech.13 He cannot recite 
the alphabet past the letter “G.”14 He cannot count by threes, and he 
                                                     
6  Madison v. State, 545 So. 2d 94, 99 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). 
7  Madison v. State, 620 So. 2d 62, 73 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (reversing the conviction 
due to erroneously admitted expert testimony based on facts not in evidence, despite the fact 
that the defendant did not object at trial, because it “constituted an error so obvious that the 
failure to notice it seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings”). 
8  Madison v. State, 718 So. 2d 90, 94, 103–04 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); see EQUAL 
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN ALABAMA: JUDGE OVERRIDE 4 (2011), 
https://eji.org/sites/default/files/death-penalty-in-alabama-judge-override.pdf (noting that as 
of 2011, judicial override is legal only in Alabama, Delaware, and Florida). Alabama finally 
abandoned judicial overrides in 2017; it was the last state in the country to do so. See Kent 
Faulk, Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey signs bill: Judges can no longer override juries in death penalty 
cases, AL.COM (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/ 
index.ssf/2017/04/post_317.html (showing that the Alabama Governor signed a bill into law 
doing away with judicial overrides in capital murder cases). 
9  Madison, 718 So. 2d at 94. The same judge overrode jury recommendations for the 
imposition of life sentences in five other capital cases—this was more than any other judge 
in Alabama. Petition, supra note 5, at 6 n.3. 
10  Petition, supra note 5, at 1–2, 9–10, 12. 
11  Brief of Petitioner at 8, Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed May 22, 2018). 
12  Id. at 10. Borderline intellectual functioning refers to IQ scores in the 70 to 75 
range, which places a person on the borderline of criteria for the diagnosis of intellectual 
disability under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) V.  See 
Amy Logsdon, Borderline Intellectual Functioning, VERYWELLMIND (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-borderline-intellectual-functioning-2161698.  
13  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 29. 
14  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 11. 
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cannot walk without assistance.15 He is disoriented as to time and place, 
so he cannot tell you the date, or the month, or even the day of the week.16 
He continually soils himself because he does not remember that there is a 
toilet right next to his bed and he is legally blind so he does not see it 
sitting there.17 Most significantly in this particular case, Madison has no 
memory of his crime—and I want to take a moment to name that. 
Madison’s crime was the murder of a police officer, someone who gave his 
professional life to protecting others. At this point in time, Madison has 
no memory of that; he has no recall of the murder that put him on death 
row.18 The area of his brain where tissue is dying is the area that controls 
memory; that is why his disorder is a form of dementia.19  
Importantly, none of this is contested.20 There is no claim that 
Madison is malingering, no claim that he is making this up.21 You can see 
the brain damage on the MRIs; the evidence is quite clear. Madison’s 
condition is not in question. 
Also not contested is the legal standard governing competence to be 
executed, at least in the abstract. Both parties agree that competency to 
be executed requires an inmate to have a rational understanding of the 
reason for his or her execution.22 Madison says he lacks that 
understanding because he cannot remember the crime, and thus cannot 
understand the punishment.  Alabama argues that Madison’s failure to 
remember the crime for which he is being executed does not, in and of 
itself, render him incompetent.23 By Alabama’s view, Madison 
understands that the state wants to put him to death as punishment for 
a murder that he was found to have committed, and that is enough.24 He 
may not remember the murder. He may even deny that it happened 
(which, he does).25 The state may have to keep telling him about it because 
he keeps forgetting. But the bottom line is that Madison understands that 
the state says he killed someone and wants to execute him as a result, and 
that rational understanding is (at least according to Alabama) all that the 
                                                     
15  Id. at 1, 11. 
16  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 6.  
17  Id. at 17; Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4–5.  
18  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 10. 
19  Petition, supra note 5, at 9–10. 
20  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing that evidence of Madison’s 
medical condition and dementia was unrebutted); see also Brief of Respondent at 13, 
Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505 (U.S. filed July 31, 2018) (conceding the fact of Madison’s 
dementia and arguing that, even if Madison does not remember the offense, he is not thereby 
rendered incompetent). 
21  Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 12. 
22  Id. at 22–23; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 13. 
23  Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 13, 20. 
24  Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22. 
25  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 19; Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22. 
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Supreme Court requires.26 The trial court apparently agreed, although the 
basis for its ruling was not as clear as one might have hoped.27 
That is a basic recitation of the facts and what is at stake. At oral 
arguments, Justice Sotomayor summarized all of this quite nicely when 
she said:  
So we have a man here who . . . can’t move on his own, can’t remember 
where the bathroom is next to him, can’t see, slurs his words. He’s really 
not quite there. But he knows that someone says he committed a 
murder and that they’re trying to kill him, but he doesn’t understand 
why. He can’t be present enough in time to rationally understand or 
reflect on what he has done because he can’t retain information for 
long.28  
And why is it, she asked counsel for the State of Alabama, that the law 
says it is okay to execute this man?29  
Madison v. Alabama is a fascinating case, and the question that 
Justice Sotomayor asks—the question that the Supreme Court is 
currently grappling with—is a worthy one. But in this address, I am going 
to take a step back and ask a more fundamental question, a question about 
how someone in Madison’s position from the start—someone suffering 
from severe mental illness not only at the end of the capital justice process, 
but from the beginning (and Madison may well fit that bill too)30—could 
be at risk of receiving the death penalty in the first place. One might not 
care what happens to someone who has their full faculties at the time of 
                                                     
26  Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 22. 
27  See Order, State of Alabama v. Madison, No. 1985-001385.80 (Cir. Ct. Mobile 
Cnty., Ala., Jan. 16, 2018) (ruling that Madison did not satisfy the substantial threshold of 
insanity required by the United States Supreme Court for a stay of execution). There appears 
to be some dispute over what the trial court held and over what the state’s position was 
before the trial court. Compare Brief of Petitioner, supra note 11, at 21, 23–24 (asserting 
that the circuit court reasoned that vascular dementia does not constitute a medical 
condition that meet the standard for incompetency) with Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, 
at 22 (asserting that the circuit court found that Madison rationally understood his 
punishment even though he suffered from dementia). The clearest recitation of the trial 
court’s holding appears to be the district court’s denial of habeas relief, which states that the 
trial court based its finding of competency, at least in part on the evidence that Madison did 
not suffer from paranoia, delusion or psychosis. Madison v. Dunn, No. 16-00191-KD-M, 2016 
WL 2732193, at *9, *11 (S.D. Ala. May 10, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Madison v. Comm’r. Ala. 
Dep’t of Corr., 851 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2017). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
reversed the district court on this issue, also understood Alabama to argue that which it 
steadfastly denies arguing in the Supreme Court. See Madison v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 
851 F.3d 1173, 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he State suggests that only a prisoner 
suffering from gross delusions can show incompetency under [the established standard].”). 
28  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 45.  
29  Id. 
30  See Petition, supra note 5, at 5 (“Mr. Madison’s struggles with mental illness had 
been observed since he was an adolescent, including by prison psychiatrists in Mississippi 
as documented in medical records introduced by the defense. To control his illness, Mr. 
Madison had been prescribed numerous anti-psychotic medications.”).    
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the crime and throughout the trial and sentencing phase, but then loses 
those faculties at the end (although I would hope we would care here too)—
but for every Madison, there are dozens of capital offenders who suffer 
from severe mental illness when they come into the capital justice system, 
and they are my interest here. My question is how it is that we—and I use 
“we” here intentionally, because when the state executes, it executes in 
our name—so how is it that we would even be thinking about executing 
the severely mentally ill, given that the death penalty is supposed to be 
for the worst of the worst offenders?  
The premise here is worth pausing to underscore. The Supreme Court 
has said time and again that the death penalty is not just for any 
murderer; it is for the worst of the worst offenders.31 On this point, the 
Court has not budged. The fact that the death penalty was palpably not 
being meted out in this fashion was what led the Supreme Court to strike 
it down in 1972.32 And the states’ adoption of so-called “guided discretion” 
statutes that promised to channel jury discretion to remedy this deficiency 
is what led the Court to reinstate the death penalty four years later in 
1976.33 As the Supreme Court stated in its 2008 decision Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, “[C]apital punishment must ‘be limited to those offenders who 
commit a “narrow category of the most serious crimes” and whose extreme 
culpability makes them “the most deserving of execution.”’”34 This is the 
core constitutional proviso that comes with the state’s power to put people 
to death: it is reserved for the worst, most culpable offenders and the 
worst, most serious crimes.  
And that brings me back to my question: how is it that we are in the 
position of executing the severely mentally ill in the first place? By 
definition, they are not the worst offenders; they are severely mentally ill.  
                                                     
31 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (“Capital punishment must be limited 
to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”) (quoting Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)).  
32  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (invalidating the death 
penalty in certain cases as a violation of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); 
see also id. at 293–94 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When the punishment of death is inflicted 
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually 
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery 
system. . . . When the rate of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only 
the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this 
punishment.”).  
33  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 195 (1976) (stating that reinstating the 
death penalty is “an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes,” and 
explaining that “the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed 
in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures 
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance”).  
34  554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 568). 
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By “severely mentally ill,” I mean those who have a diagnosed severe 
mental illness in the DSM-5—the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.35 The DSM-5 is 
the gold standard, and it defines severe mental illness as a clinically 
recognized, significant disturbance in cognition, regulating emotion, or 
behavior that reflects a severe impairment or dysfunction in mental 
functioning and is relatively persistent over time.36 I am talking about 
illnesses like schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, that sort of thing.37 These 
are people who are seriously sick; they are not just having a bad day. 
Now that we know who I am talking about, I can turn to the what. 
What I will be talking about is how the severely mentally ill could be at 
risk of the death penalty in the first place. In some ways, Madison is an 
anomaly. Although there is reason to think that he suffered from a severe 
mental illness all along,38 his case before the Supreme Court considers 
only his condition as it has developed and deteriorated from his stay on 
death row. But in other ways Madison is not an anomaly; he is but one 
example of a much larger phenomenon. As I will discuss, states impose 
the death penalty on people with severe mental illness all the time; in fact, 
they are a good chunk of the demographic of the people we execute.39 What 
I want to do is rewind and start from the beginning; I want to figure out 
how we could get to this place where it is okay to condemn someone like 
Madison in the first place. Then, more briefly, at the end of the talk, I will 
ask what it is that we think we are accomplishing when we condemn and 
execute the severely mentally ill.40 That is to say, what societal purposes 
does this serve? This is an important question because, as I said, the state 
is executing in our name. So we ought to know, we ought to be able to 
articulate, what it is we are getting out of it when we put these people to 
death. Then finally, I will close my remarks with an observation about 
                                                     
35 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013). 
36  See id. at 20 (defining mental illness as a “clinically significant disturbance in an 
individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a dysfunction in the 
psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning”); AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, PROFICIENCY IN PSYCHOLOGY: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SERIOUS 
MENTAL ILLNESS 5 (2009) (“[Serious mental illness] refers to mental disorders that carry 
certain diagnoses, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression; that are 
relatively persistent (e.g., lasting at least a year); and that result in comparatively severe 
impairment in major areas of functioning . . . .”). 
37  See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW PROJECT, 
SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY 9–14 (2016) (discussing the difference 
between mental illness and severe mental illness, as well as the major types of severe mental 
illness) [hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N]. 
38 See supra note 32. 
39  See infra notes 114–148 and accompanying text.  
40  See infra Part II.  
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what all this says about us, because how we treat those who we might 
justifiably despise says as much about us as it does about them.41  
I. HOW THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL END UP IN THE CAPITAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM AND WHY THEY CANNOT GET OUT 
How is it that the severely mentally ill end up in the snare of the 
capital justice system in the first place?  Answering this question is the 
main focus of this talk, and so I will be spending the bulk of my time here.  
In this regard, there are four pieces of the puzzle that are critical to 
understand.  Madison is a snapshot of the end of the line, the last piece of 
the puzzle. I want to start at the beginning, and in the beginning was 
deinstitutionalization.  
A. Deinstitutionalization 
To have a cohort of severely mentally ill people in the capital justice 
system, you have to have a cohort of severely mentally ill people 
committing aggravated murder. And to understand how that has come to 
pass, you have to understand deinstitutionalization in the 1970s and 
reinstitutionalization thereafter through the criminal justice system.  
There is much to say about deinstitutionalization, but this is just the first 
stop on our journey. There are other stops we need to get to as well, and 
Dr. Hudacek has done a nice job of providing some of the details on this 
issue during her panel,42 so my overview comments will suffice. 
Deinstitutionalization refers to a phenomenon that began in the 
1960s, and went into high gear in the 1970s, to move the severely mentally 
ill out of state institutions and into the community.43 As a result of 
deinstitutionalization, the number of people committed to public 
psychiatric hospitals in 1955 had dropped by 87 percent in 1994.44  That 
is an astonishingly high percentage.  By way of sheer numbers, in 1955, 
there were roughly 558,000 severely mentally ill people living in the 
nation’s public psychiatric hospitals.45 By 1994, that number was under 
72,000—and this was forty years later, when the country’s population had 
                                                     
41  See infra Part III. 
42  Kristen Hudacek, Doctor of Psychology, Dir. of Psychology and Pretrial Forensic 
Servs. at E. State Hosp., Panel 2: Mental Health within the Court System at the Regent 
University Law Review Annual Symposium (Nov. 2, 2018). 
43  See E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL 
ILLNESS CRISIS 8 (1997) (defining deinstitutionalization and explaining that the practice 
began in 1955, when antipsychotic medication was first introduced, and heightened around 
1965, when Medicaid and Medicare funding became available). 
44  See id. (explaining that the number of mentally ill patients admitted to hospitals 
dropped from 558,239 in 1955 to 71,619 in 1994).  
45  Id. 
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grown by over 50 percent, and its mentally ill population had grown along 
with it.46  
Who were these people who were deinstitutionalized? For starters, 
one had to be significantly mentally ill to be institutionalized in the first 
place. Here are the general contours: between 50 to 60 percent of those 
who were deinstitutionalized had been diagnosed with schizophrenia.47  
Another 10 to 15 percent had organic brain diseases; they were brain-
damaged as a result of trauma, strokes, Alzheimer’s, that sort of thing.48 
Vernon Madison would fall into this category. Another 10 to 15 percent 
were diagnosed with manic-depressive disorders or severe depression.49 
The idea behind deinstitutionalization was to treat these patients in 
the least restrictive setting possible.50 As President Jimmy Carter’s 
Commission on Mental Health explained, “[T]he objective [is] maintaining 
the greatest degree of freedom, self-determination, autonomy, dignity, and 
integrity of body, mind, and spirit for the individual while he or she 
participates in treatment or receives services.”51  Deinstitutionalization 
was intended to be a progressive policy—an enlightened, more humane 
way of treating the severely mentally ill. 
The problem was that state legislatures around the country were not 
willing to spend the money to give these people, who were now back out 
in the community, the mental health services they needed.52 Part of the 
reason fiscal conservatives had joined progressives in supporting 
deinstitutionalization was to reduce the stress on the public coffers, so 
funding for community services did not enjoy the same support that 
                                                     
46  Id. Between 1955 and 1994, the nation’s population grew from 164 million to 260 
million, and assuming that the proportion of severely mentally ill stayed roughly the same, 
the number of patients in mental hospitals absent deinstitutionalization would have been 
around 885,000. Id.  
47  Id. at 10.  
48  Id.  
49  Id.  
50  Id.  
51  Id. at 10–11. 
52  See id. at 10 (discussing how deinstitutionalization aggravated the incidence of 
mental illness by discharging patients without ensuring that they received the medicine and 
medical services necessary for their reintegration into society); see also Newt Gingrich & Van 
Jones, Opinion, Mental Illness is No Crime, CNN (May 27, 2015, 7:57 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/opinions/gingrich-jones-mental-health/index.html (“When 
governments closed state-run psychiatric facilities in the late 1970s, it didn’t replace them 
with community care . . . .”). 
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deinstitutionalization did.53  The mentally ill went without, resulting in a 
national mental health crisis.54 
And we are still in it today. Over 2.2 million severely mentally ill 
people—2.2 million people who are not just suffering from mental illness, 
but suffering on the scale of extreme mental impairment and 
dysfunction—are out in the community and not receiving psychiatric 
treatment.55  They say that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, 
and deinstitutionalization is Exhibit A for the old adage being true.  Sadly, 
most of these people just ended up on the streets.56  
And from there, they ended up in correctional facilities. The 
phenomenon has been called the “criminalization of the mentally ill,”57 
and California is a perfect example.  Progressive California was at the 
forefront of the deinstitutionalization movement, passing legislation to 
effectuate the policy in 1969.58  In its first year of deinstitutionalization, 
the number of mentally ill people entering its criminal justice system 
doubled.59 By 1975, the number of severely mentally ill individuals in 
California’s prisons and jails had grown 300 percent.60  As one prison 
psychiatrist in California explained:  
We are literally drowning in patients, running around trying to put our 
fingers in the bursting dikes, while hundreds of men continue to 
deteriorate psychiatrically before our eyes into serious psychoses. . . . 
The crisis stems from recent changes in the mental health laws allowing 
more mentally sick patients to be shifted away from the mental health 
department into the department of corrections.61 
Treating the mentally ill in a least restrictive setting turned out to be not 
so progressive after all.  These people were taken out of mental hospitals 
                                                     
53  Harold Pollack, What Happened to U.S. Mental Health Care After 
Deinstitutionalization?, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/wonk/wp/2013/06/12/what-happened-to-u-s-mental-health-care-after-deinstitutionalization 
/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9a53398b4454. 
54  Samantha Raphelson, How the Loss of U.S. Psychiatric Hospitals Led to a Mental 
Health Crisis, NPR (Nov. 30, 2017, 1:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/ 
567477160/how-the-loss-of-u-s-psychiatric-hospitals-led-to-a-mental-health-crisis. 
55  Jonaki Bose et al., Key Substance Use and Mental Health Indicators in the United 
States: Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA (Sept. 
2018), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHFFR2017/NS 
DUHFFR2017.pdf. 
56  See TORREY, supra note 43, at 11 (explaining that deinstitutionalized persons did 
not successfully reintegrate back to society, but instead they ended up homeless or 
incarcerated). 
57  See Anastasia Cooper, Note, The Ongoing Correctional Chaos in Criminalizing 
Mental Illness: The Realignment’s Effects on California Jails, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J., 
339, 342 (1988). 
58  TORREY, supra note 43, at 36.  
59  Id.  
60  Id. 
61  Id.  
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and left on the streets, where many eventually made their way back to 
secure beds—but in correctional facilities instead. 
Fast forward to today, when jails and prisons are the single largest 
residential mental institution in our country.62 A 2010 study concluded 
that there are now more than three times more severely mentally ill 
persons in jails and prisons than in hospitals.63 In Virginia, for a local 
perspective, the Hampton Roads Regional Jail is the state’s largest 
repository for the mentally ill.64  Forty-three other states and the District 
of Columbia have a similar story to tell.65 
Where does all this leave us? When you put these people back in the 
community without treatment, they do not have their illness under control 
and have little chance of functioning as productive members of society, so 
there are going to be issues. Then when you add in substance abuse—and 
you have to, because if these people are not on their meds like they need 
to be, they are going to be suffering and you can bet they are going to self-
medicate66—what you get is severely mentally ill people who are off their 
meds and on substances that impair their judgment and reduce their 
inhibitions, and that is going to result in some capital murders. It is worth 
noting that people with mental illness are much more likely to be the 
victims of violent crime than the perpetrators.67 Indeed, people with 
severe mental illness are eleven times more likely to be the victims of a 
violent crime than members of the general population.68 But a slice of this 
population is also going to victimize; some of the severely mentally ill will 
end up committing capital murder.  
Of course, to get to death row, capital offenders who are severely 
mentally ill first have to get convicted and sentenced to death. One would 
think that the capital justice system would weed these people out, but it 
                                                     
62  See Gingrich, supra note 52 (“The estimated number of inmates with mental illness 
outstrips the number of patients in state psychiatric hospitals by a factor of 10.”). 
63  E. FULLER TORREY, ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND 
PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 1, 8 (2010). 
64  Dave Ress, Hampton Roads Regional Jail: By Default, Virginia’s Largest Mental 
Hospital, DAILYPRESS (July 9, 2016, 5:40 PM), https://www.dailypress.com/news/politics/dp-
nws-regional-jail-20160710-story.html. 
65  Gingrich, supra note 52 (“Today, in 44 states and the District of Columbia, the 
largest prison or jail holds more people with serious mental illness than the largest 
psychiatric hospital.”). 
66  AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, supra note 36, at 3 (“It has been estimated that half of 
individuals with SMI will have a co-occurring substance abuse problem at some point in their 
lives. Compared with the general population, for example, people with schizophrenia are 
more than four times as likely to have a substance use disorder; those with bipolar disorder 
are more than five times as likely.”). 
67  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 17. 
68  Id.  
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does not. Why that is so is the second piece of the puzzle, and the topic I 
turn to next.  
B. The Capital Litigation Process 
The second piece of the puzzle is that the capital litigation process 
not only fails to screen out those with severe mental illness, but in many 
ways, it does just the opposite—it pulls these people into the dragnet even 
more. Both aspects of the problem are important. The first concerns legal 
doctrines that one would think would screen out the severely mentally ill, 
but often do not. Two, in particular, come to mind.  
One is competency to stand trial. This doctrine is grounded in due 
process and designed to ensure that defendants can adequately 
participate in their defense.69 It turns out to be a very low standard, 
requiring only a minimal ability to consult with a lawyer and understand 
the proceedings.70 Importantly, a person can have a severe mental illness 
and still be legally competent to stand trial.71  
A prime example is Scott Panetti, the capital defendant in Panetti v. 
Quarterman.72 I will be returning to Panetti v. Quarterman because it is 
one of the two leading cases governing competency to be executed,73 but 
for now my focus is competency to stand trial. Here are the facts. Scott 
Panetti was found competent to stand trial even though he had been 
hospitalized more than a dozen times for mental health-related reasons, 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and was suffering from hallucinations.74 He 
chose to represent himself in his capital trial in Texas in 1995, and showed 
up dressed in a purple cowboy outfit.75 He tried to subpoena the Pope. He 
tried to subpoena John F. Kennedy (who, it goes without saying, had long 
been dead). He tried to subpoena Jesus Christ.76 As to the latter, I cannot 
                                                     
69  See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385–86 (1966) (holding that the issue of a 
defendant’s competency to stand trial implicates his right to a fair trial because it puts in 
question his ability to assist in his own defense); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960) (holding that competence to stand trial requires more than mere recollection of events 
and looks at the defendant’s ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding). 
70  Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (“[T]he test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.”). 
71  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 19. 
72  551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
73  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 19–22 (highlighting case studies on the trials 
of Scott Panetti and Kelsey Patterson, respectively, to discuss a mentally ill defendant’s 
competency to stand trial and the effect of raising an insanity defense). 
74  Panetti , 551 U.S. at 936, 940–42. 
75  Id. at 935–36; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20. 
76  Panetti v. Quarterman, No. A-04-CA-042-SS, 2008 WL 2338498, at *35 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 26, 2008); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20. 
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help but think—and I will go ahead and say it since I am here at Regent—
that Jesus was whispering softly in his ear, “Hey Panetti, you don’t have 
to subpoena me. I’m always with you.” But Panetti could not hear that 
voice, perhaps because he was hearing other voices instead. All this, and 
Panetti was found competent to stand trial.77 It is a stunning indictment 
of our capital justice system, and a vivid example of just how low the 
competency bar actually is. As one might have guessed, Panetti was 
convicted and sentenced to death.78  
The second doctrine is the insanity defense. The insanity defense is 
an affirmative defense to a crime; a defendant pleads not guilty by reason 
of insanity (“NGRI”).79 The standard for asserting this defense varies from 
state to state, but most states require some showing that as a result of a 
mental illness, the defendant did not know the nature of the act that he 
or she was doing, or did not know it was wrong, or, in a small number of 
states, that the defendant could not control his or her actions.80 Whatever 
the version, that is a very narrow test, and it is not going to weed out 
people with most mental illnesses, even severe ones.81 You can see this in 
how much the doctrine is used: NGRI is asserted in just 1 percent of all 
criminal cases, and even then, it is successful only 25 percent of the time.82  
NGRI is an especially risky defense in a capital trial, because jurors 
tend to view it as a legal loophole that could put the defendant back out 
on the streets.83 In practice, that is not what happens; states are pretty 
good about involuntarily committing people when they are mentally ill 
and have gone out and killed somebody.84 But the fact remains that NGRI 
is a complete defense—as in the verdict, if the jury buys it, is not guilty. 
That is a tough pill to swallow in a murder trial where the person has 
obviously killed the victim. In a moment, I will talk more about how both 
doctrines, NGRI and competency to stand trial, end up working against 
the severely mentally ill, but for now, the point is that NGRI is rarely 
applicable and rarely successful, so it is rarely ever used.  
                                                     
77  Panetti, 551 U.S. at 936.  
78  Id. at 937. 
79  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 20 (discussing the affirmative defense of NGRI). 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 21. 
82  Id.  
83  Id.  Although state practice varies, the Supreme Court has held that at least under 
federal law, including general federal criminal practice, courts are not required to inform 
juries that defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity will be involuntarily committed 
and not released into society, rejecting a defendant’s claim that an instruction was needed 
to counter jurors’ mistaken perception to the contrary. See Shannon v. United States, 512 
U.S. 573 (1994). 
84  See id. (explaining that the successful use of the NGRI defense normally results in 
a defendant being sent to a psychiatric institution). 
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By way of example, we could go back to Panetti, as he also pled 
NGRI85—unsuccessfully, obviously—but, an equally powerful example is 
the case of Kelsey Patterson. Patterson had been diagnosed with paranoid 
schizophrenia in 1981 and was in and out of mental hospitals multiple 
times in the 1980s.86 In 1992, Patterson walked into a store and randomly 
shot a businessman and his administrative assistant.87 He then dropped 
his gun, stripped down to his socks—and I mean he took off everything 
except for his socks—and paced the floor, mumbling incoherently, until 
the police arrived.88 At trial, the jury rejected Patterson’s insanity 
defense.89 He was found guilty and sentenced to death.90 So clear was the 
evidence of Patterson’s severe mental illness that the Texas Board of 
Pardons and Paroles recommended clemency by a vote of five-to-one.91 It 
was only the second recommendation for clemency in the Board’s entire 
history.92 That recommendation went to the governor, who was Rick Perry 
at the time, and he rejected it.93 The State of Texas executed Patterson 
the next day.94  
Those are the two doctrinal failsafes, the safety valves for those with 
serious mental health problems to escape the capital justice system, and 
neither does much work in screening out capital offenders with severe 
mental illness. The question then becomes whether the capital litigation 
process provides other ways to sift out those who are severely mentally ill, 
and the reality is that being severely mentally ill in the capital litigation 
process actually cuts the other way. Rather than making it less likely that 
a defendant will be convicted and sentenced to death, severe mental 
illness makes it more so.  
There are a number of reasons why this is true. First, the severely 
mentally ill are more likely to confess, even to crimes they did not 
commit.95 The last panel of today’s symposium is dedicated to 
understanding why those with intellectual disabilities and mental illness 
are more likely to be falsely convicted so I will not go into detail here, but 
it is worth noting that the National Registry of Exonerations lists 103 
                                                     
85  Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 936 (2007). 
86  Patterson v. Cockrell, 69 F. App’x 658, at *1 (5th Cir. 2003); AM. BAR ASS’N, supra 
note 37, at 22. 
87  Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22.  
88  Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1. 
89  Id.; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22. 
90  Patterson, 69 F. App’x at *1; AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22. 
91  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 22. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: 
The List Keeps Growing, 46 INTELL. AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 468, 468 (2008). 
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exonerations by those with mental illness or intellectual disability; of 
those 103, nearly three-quarters—72 percent—had falsely confessed to 
the crime.96 We might have guessed this would be true; the mentally 
infirm are more susceptible to manipulation and suggestion, and that 
makes them more susceptible to confessing in response to police 
interrogation.97 Whether the confession is true or false, the point here is 
that the severely mentally ill are more likely to come to trial having given 
one, and that makes them more likely to be convicted, which in turn puts 
them more at risk of being sentenced to death.  
Second, it is more difficult for the severely mentally ill to cooperate 
with their lawyer to mount an effective defense.98 For example, they often 
have confused and disordered thinking and have difficulty communicating 
in ways that make sense, particularly when trying to explain the details 
of what happened on a given occasion or when answering questions that 
can help piece together a mitigation case based on their social history.99 
Sometimes they suffer from paranoia, so they do not trust their lawyers 
and as a result, do not share things with them, or even worse, work in 
passive-aggressive ways to undermine the representation.100 Sometimes 
they do not want to talk about their mental illness, especially if it was 
caused by trauma; they just do not want to relive those memories, so they 
are utterly uncooperative in building a defense based on their mental 
illness.101 And sometimes they also have a personality disorder of some 
sort that makes them just plain difficult to work with and, well, difficult 
                                                     
96  Samuel Gross & Maurice Possley, For 50 Years, You’ve Had “The Right to Remain 
Silent”, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 12, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2016/06/12/for-50-years-you-ve-had-the-right-to-remain-silent; Mary Kelly Tate, Dir., Inst. 
for Actual Innocence, and Professor, Univ. of Richmond, Closing Remarks: Mental Health 
and Wrongful Convictions/Sentencing at the Regent University Law Review Annual 
Symposium (Nov. 2, 2018). 
97  Perske, supra note 95, at 468; Saul M. Kassin et. al., Police-Induced Confessions: 
Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 L. HUM. BEHAV. 3, 21 (2010), https://www.jstor.org/ 
stable/40608053?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents (“[P]ersons with mental 
illness are over-represented in these [false confession] cases. Psychological disorder is often 
accompanied by faulty reality monitoring, distorted perception, impaired judgment, anxiety, 
mood disturbance, poor self-control, and feelings of guilt.”). 
98  Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle, 
Mentally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
487, 512–13 (2014). This factor is one of several that support what Professor Scott Sundby 
calls the “unreliability principle”—the notion that if the jury cannot reliably take into 
account certain factors in mitigation, then the death penalty cannot constitutionally be 
imposed. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 31–32 (discussing the unreliability principle and 
referring to the Atkins and Roper factors as Sundby factors); Sundby, supra note 98, at 505, 
511. 
99  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 514. 
100  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 514. 
101  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23; Sundby, supra note 98, at 513. 
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to like.102 All this makes effective representation of severely mentally ill 
capital defendants really, really hard. My hat goes off to the very special 
class of lawyers who do capital defense work, especially when it involves 
representing the severely mentally ill.  
Third, and relatedly, there are some decisions in the capital litigation 
process that only the defendant can make. The right to waive the right to 
an attorney and represent oneself at trial, the right to waive an appeal, 
the right to testify, and the right to plead not guilty, even when the 
evidence is overwhelming and a plea deal would take death off the table—
all these are decisions that belong to the defendant alone.103 As the Panetti 
case showed, severe mental illness can lead to some really bad decisions, 
and that can mean the difference between life and death. 
Fourth and finally, the drugs that severely mentally ill people need 
to take in order to get their illness under control tend to make their 
emotional affect appear flat, which is particularly bad in a capital trial 
because it can be mistakenly interpreted as a lack of remorse.104 That said, 
the alternative may be worse. If mentally ill capital defendants do not take 
their meds because they do not want their affect to be flat, they run the 
risk of showing up at trial looking agitated, disruptive, and out of 
control.105 Then they are dangerous looking, and that is the last thing they 
want to be, at least if they want the jury to choose life.106  
Everything I have said thus far has been about the trial process, but 
the sentencing phase of a capital trial poses special dangers for the 
severely mentally ill as well. Under the law, mental illness is a mitigating 
circumstance—something the jury considers in determining whether a 
convicted murderer is among the worst of the worst for whom a death 
sentence is appropriate.107 But research shows that juries often use severe 
mental illness as an aggravator instead.108 You may have heard of the 
Capital Jury Project; it is a National Science Foundation-funded project 
                                                     
102  See Sam Glover, Learn to Deal with Mentally-Ill Clients, LAWYERIST.COM (Feb. 19, 
2014), https://lawyerist.com/deal-with-mentally-ill-clients/ (providing a candid discussion of 
the challenges of representing the mentally ill). 
103  See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1993) (holding that a defendant who 
is competent to stand trial is competent to make decisions belonging to client alone, such as 
whether to plead guilty and whether to waive the right to an attorney and proceed pro se). 
104  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 32; Sundby, supra note 98, at 515. 
105  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 23. 
106  See id. (discussing how jurors are more likely to find the death sentence 
appropriate if they perceive a defendant as dangerous).  
107  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982) (treating a defendant’s mental and 
emotional development as a mitigating factor for sentencing); e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 607 (1978) (recognizing mental deficiency as a mitigating circumstance). 
108  See Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in 
Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 299 (1989) (explaining that once mental illness 
is introduced in mitigation, the prosecution may use it as an aggravating factor because of a 
likelihood of future dangerousness).  
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aimed at finding out how capital jurors think—when they choose death 
and why, that sort of thing.109 What the Capital Jury Project’s research 
has shown is that a claim of either insanity or incompetence to stand trial 
is one of the strongest correlates with a death sentence.110 That does not 
prove causation, of course; it is just a strong association. But when you 
think about the reasons that jurors choose death—and a finding of “future 
dangerousness” is right up there111—this makes complete sense. When a 
jury sees a killer with a severe mental illness, someone so sick as to plead 
insanity or to say he or she is not even competent to stand trial, there is a 
good chance the jury is going to check the box for future dangerousness.112 
If mental illness makes a person dangerous (and if the illness played any 
part in the murder, there is reason to think that is true), then it makes 
sense for a jury to think that the person is going to be dangerous going 
forward. That is just intrinsic to the nature of the person’s mental illness. 
It is a part of who that person is.113 
All the factors I have discussed result in a substantial proportion of 
severely mentally ill people in our prisons generally, and on death row 
specifically. By way of comparison, around 4 percent of the general 
population suffers from a severe mental illness.114 When you look at the 
percentage of those with severe mental illness in our correctional 
facilities, that figure jumps to around 10 percent—more than double what 
you see in the general population.115 And when you look at death row, that 
percentage doubles again; at least 20 percent of the condemned on death 
row suffer from a severe mental illness.116 That brings me to death row. 
                                                     
109  What is the Capital Jury Project, U. ALBANY SCH. CRIM. JUST., 
https://www.albany.edu/scj/13189.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2019). 
110  See DAVID BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 644–45 app. L, 
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112  Id. at 519. 
113  See id. (summarizing a jury’s decision to vote in favor of imposing the death penalty 
as based on the incurable nature of the defendant’s mental illness). 
114  Mental Illness, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH (Nov. 2017), https://www.nimh. 
nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness.shtml (estimating the prevalence of serious mental 
illness among the U.S. adult population at 4.2% as of 2016).  
115  AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 15.  
116  Id. at 16. 
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C. Death Row 
If a capital offender is not suffering from mental illness before 
arriving on death row, there is a good chance he or she will develop one 
just as a result of being there. In virtually every state, death row consists 
of solitary confinement where the condemned are kept for at least 22 hours 
each day in the confines of a windowless cell the size of a standard parking 
lot space.117 Take a moment to think about just how small that is. They 
are monitored by cameras, spoken to through intercoms, and fed through 
a slot in the door.118 They have limited access to books and magazines, and 
virtually no contact with other human beings.119 These are the conditions 
of solitary confinement on death row, and the condemned are subject to 
its hallmarks—extreme isolation and forced idleness—for agonizingly 
long periods of time.  
How long, you are probably wondering. In 1987, the average time 
between death sentence and execution was seven years.120 In 1997, the 
average time between death sentence and execution was 11 years.121 In 
2007, it was a little less than 13 years.122 And in 2017, the average time 
on death row of those executed that year was 19 years. 123 Nineteen years 
in solitary confinement. Just take a moment to let that sink in.  
One might respond by saying, “Then just hurry the heck up.” And 
that would be a reasonable response, except for the fact that two-thirds of 
all death sentences are reversed, and the top two reasons for reversal are 
prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel.124 Those 
are not mere legal technicalities; those are serious errors that go to the 
very heart of the capital justice system and the state’s ability to put 
someone to death. Then there is the estimated 4 percent of factually 
                                                     
117  Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment Is Collapsing 
Under Its Own Weight, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
CULTURE 30, 40 (Austin Sarat, ed., 2017).  
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119 See David. R. Dow, Life Without Parole: A Different Death Penalty, THE NATION, 
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 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 226 
innocent people still sitting on death row.125 So no, I do not think the right 
answer is to just cut off appeals and speed up the back end of the process.  
In any event, what extreme isolation for extreme periods of time 
produces is something psychologists call “isolation sickness.”126 In the 
context of the condemned, it is also known as “death row syndrome.”127 
Research shows that even a few days in solitary confinement will cause a 
shift in EEG patterns indicative of cerebral dysfunction.128 Over time, the 
effects are debilitating, and what psychologists are seeing among those on 
death row is similar to the damage suffered by victims of severe sensory 
deprivation torture techniques.129 One study reported that of prisoners in 
isolation, 91 percent suffered from anxiety, 88 percent suffered from 
ruminations or intrusive thoughts, 86 percent suffered from 
hypersensitivity to stimuli, 84 percent had difficulty with concentration 
and memory, 84 percent had confused thought process, 71 percent 
experienced severe mood and emotional swings, 61 percent had violent 
fantasies, 44 percent experienced perceptual distortions, and 41 percent 
had hallucinations.130 In the same study, 34 percent of the prisoners 
experienced all eight of these effects, and 56 percent experienced at least 
five of them.131  
For those with severe mental illness coming in, the adverse effects of 
solitary confinement are even more damaging. Studies show that the 
stressors of extreme isolation make everything worse for those with 
preexisting mental health problems; it exacerbates the problems they 
already have.132 As one federal judge put the point, “[P]utting mentally ill 
prisoners in isolated confinement ‘is the mental equivalent of putting an 
asthmatic in a place with little air.’”133 The sick get sicker, and they just 
languish that way, getting sicker and sicker, until it is time for them to 
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die. And that brings me to the last piece of the puzzle, competency to be 
executed. 
D. Competency to be Executed 
I have finally made my way back to Madison v. Alabama, where our 
journey began,134 and now we know a lot more about how the severely 
mentally ill could be at risk of execution in the first place. But there is still 
one more legal failsafe, one more safety net that could spare the severely 
mentally ill, and that is the requirement that they be competent to be 
executed.  
At the moment, there are just two Supreme Court cases on this issue; 
Madison will make three. The first of those is Ford v. Wainwright, which 
the Court decided in 1986.135 Ford was convicted of murder in 1974, and 
by 1982, after eight years on death row, his mental health had 
deteriorated.136 He started referring to himself as Pope John Paul III, he 
boasted of thwarting a Klu Klux Klan conspiracy to bury dead prisoners 
inside the prison walls, and he claimed to have appointed nine new 
justices to the Florida Supreme Court (which, by the looks of it, did not 
help him much).137 Ford also claimed that he could control the governor 
through mind waves, and that executing him was part of a Satanic 
conspiracy to keep him from preaching the gospel.138 The Supreme Court 
looked at all this and said that it has always been clear that you could not 
execute the insane, because, well, they are insane.139 But even here, the 
Court did not go on to hold that Ford was insane; the Court just said there 
had to be a process for figuring this out, and there was not a process 
here.140 So, they sent the case back to Florida to figure out a process, and 
in the meantime, Ford, who was still languishing on death row, died of 
natural causes. At the time of his death, he was just 37 years old.141  
The other case on competency to be executed is Panetti v. 
Quarterman.142 I have already talked about the facts—Panetti was the 
guy who showed up at trial wearing a purple cowboy outfit and tried to 
subpoena Jesus Christ143—so here I will cut to the chase. The Supreme 
                                                     
134  For a discussion of Madison, see supra notes 2–28 and accompanying text.  
135  477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
136  Id. at 401–02. 
137  Id. at 402. 
138  Id. at 403. 
139  Id. at 407–08. 
140  Id. at 416–18. 
141  Alvin Ford, 37, Dies; Stricken on Death Row, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1991), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/09/obituaries/alvin-ford-37-dies-stricken-on-death-
row.html. 
142  551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
143  For further details, see supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.  
 REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 228 
Court in Panetti did not say that Panetti could not be executed. What the 
Court said is that to be competent, Panetti needed a rational 
understanding of the reason the state wanted to execute him, and as was 
the case in Ford, the state had failed to provide an adequate process for 
figuring that out.144 Fast forward to today, and the State of Texas is still 
trying to execute Scott Panetti, who appears to be sick as ever.145 
Now you know the standard governing competency to be executed—
a capital offender must have a rational understanding of the reason that 
the state wants to put him or her to death—and you know how it has 
played out. Knowing that, you also know that competency to be executed 
does not do much to keep the severely mentally ill from being executed.  If 
there is any doubt about that, just look at who it is we execute in this 
country. One study looking at executions from the years 2000 to 2015 
found that 43 percent of those executed had been diagnosed with a severe 
mental illness.146 In 2015 alone, seven of the 28 people executed suffered 
from a diagnosed severe mental illness, while another seven suffered from 
serious intellectual impairment or brain injury.147 In short, fully half of 
the people we executed in 2015 had some sort of serious intellectual 
impairment or dysfunction. When it comes to “volunteers”—condemned 
inmates who wave their appeals and say just execute me, I cannot take 
this anymore—more than 75 percent have some sort of documented 
mental illness.148  
This is who we execute. The question that naturally follows is why—
why would we want to do that? What purpose does it serve? 
                                                     
144  See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 948, 959 (defining competency to be executed and reversing 
finding of competency by state court for its failure to provide adequate means by which to 
submit expert psychiatric evidence supporting Panetti’s claim). 
145  See Jolie McCullough, Texas Death Row Inmate Scott Panetti to Get Further 
Competency Review, TEX. TRIB. (July 11, 2017 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
2017/07/11/texas-death-row-inmate-scott-panetti-get-further-competency-review/ (reporting 
that the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s denial of relief for Panetti 
on his claim of incompetence to be executed, and noting that “prison guards have noticed 
Panetti acting delusional and he has claimed to be the father of singer Selena Gomez and 
said CNN anchor Wolf Blitzer showed his stolen prison ID card on the news”). 
146  Frank R. Baumgartner & Betsy Neill, Does the Death Penalty Target People Who 
are Mentally Ill? We Checked., WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/04/03/does-the-death-penalty-target- 
people-who-are-mentally-ill-we-checked/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9cca739b0bae. 
147  2015 Executions: A Broken Capital Punishment System, CHARLES HAMILTON 
HOUS. (2015), https://charleshamiltonhouston.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2015-CH 
HIRJ-Death-Penalty-Report.pdf.  
148  John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 
MICH. L. REV. 939, 962 (2005). 
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II. WHAT PURPOSE DOES EXECUTING THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL 
SERVE? 
What is it that we are trying to accomplish when we execute the 
severely mentally ill? This is an important question, because as I 
mentioned at the beginning of this talk, the state is executing in our name. 
So we ought to be able to answer that question.  We ought to be able to 
articulate what it is that we are getting out of it when we put these people 
to death.  
This was the question I found myself asking in Madison. I mean, who 
is even pushing to execute this guy? He is blind, he is disoriented, he 
urinates on himself, and he cannot remember what he did.149 He is 
completely pathetic. It is hard to imagine that even staunch death penalty 
supporters are eager to push this rock uphill; the last thing they want is 
for people to feel sorry for the guy who gets executed. So where is all this 
going? 
Here is Alabama’s answer to that question from oral arguments in 
Madison: “The state would still have a strong interest in seeking 
retribution for a horrible crime . . . even if [the condemned inmate] can’t 
remember the crime.”150 Later in the argument, the state’s representative 
says it again: “[N]othing about Mr. Madison’s conditions impact the state’s 
interest in seeking retribution for a . . . heinous crime.”151 At least 
Alabama was clear: its interest is retribution.  
To be fair, in the state’s brief, Alabama also makes an argument 
about deterrence,152 but it is hard to think that is what is really at stake 
because the claim does not even get mentioned at oral argument. After the 
National Research Council’s 2012 report on deterrence and the death 
penalty, it is easy to see why—as the 2012 report states, the evidence does 
not support the claim that the death penalty deters murder, so we should 
leave deterrence out of the debate.153 Besides, what does that deterrence 
argument look like—we execute even the severely mentally ill, so we sure 
as heck will execute you? As the Supreme Court concluded when it 
                                                     
149  See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
150  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 44. 
151  Id. at 48. 
152  Brief of Respondent, supra note 20, at 38–40 (arguing that impairments diminish 
the deterrent effect of capital punishment only if the impairment took hold prior to the 
commission of the crime). 
153  See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 
(Daniel S. Nagin & John V. Pepper eds., 2012) (“The committee concludes that research to 
date on the effect of capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital 
punishment decreases, increases, or has no effect on homicide rates. Therefore, the 
committee recommends that these studies not be used to inform deliberations requiring 
judgments about the effect of the death penalty on homicide. . . . [and] should not influence 
policy judgments about capital punishment.”). 
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invalidated the death penalty for the intellectually disabled (as opposed 
to the mentally ill) in the 2002 case Atkins v. Virginia, exempting the 
intellectually disabled from the death penalty will not harm whatever 
deterrent effect it might have for everyone else, and including them will 
not further it because they are not operating at a level that deterrence 
requires.154 I have to think that Alabama did not mention deterrence at 
oral argument because after Atkins and the National Research Council’s 
2012 report, there was not much to say. 
That brings me back to retribution, and I do believe that is what is 
really at stake here, just as that is what the death penalty is about more 
broadly. Today’s death penalty is not about deterrence, or incapacitation, 
and it is certainly not about saving money. It is about retribution.155 It is 
about avenging the lives of those who were mercilessly slain.  
Now, I do not claim to know how the Supreme Court will come out in 
Madison, and the issue there is not whether retribution is a legitimate 
state interest in executing the severely mentally ill (although it is not 
unrelated). But it merits mention that what the Supreme Court in Atkins 
had to say about retribution in the context of executing the intellectually 
disabled is equally applicable to the severely mentally ill. There the Court 
stated:  
[Intellectually disabled] persons frequently know the difference 
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. . . . [B]y 
definition, they have diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from 
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to 
understand the reactions of others. . . . Their deficiencies do not warrant 
an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their 
personal culpability.156  
                                                     
154  536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (“The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is 
predicated upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit 
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same cognitive and 
behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally culpable—for example, the 
diminished ability to understand and process information, to learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses—that also make it less likely that they 
can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, 
control their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally retarded 
from execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with respect to offenders who 
are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are unprotected by the exemption and will 
continue to face the threat of execution.”). 
155  Polling data supports the point. See Death Penalty, GALLUP, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2019) (reporting 
the reasons why proponents of the death penalty support using the death penalty, and that 
the number one reason for supporting the death penalty is “[a]n eye for an eye/[t]hey took a 
life/[f]its the crime”). 
156  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. The 2002 Atkins opinion used the term “mentally retarded” 
to refer to this class of individuals. However, in 2010, President Barack Obama signed a bill 
into law, which removed “mentally retarded” from the U.S. Code and replaced it with the 
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The Court went on to say that the state’s interest in retribution 
“necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender,” and when it came 
to the death penalty, that interest was legitimate only to the extent “the 
most deserving of execution are put to death.”157 The defendant in Atkins 
had committed a capital crime; his convictions for abduction, armed 
robbery, and capital murder were deserving.158 But for the death penalty, 
that was not enough. “Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, 
judgment, and control of their impulses,” the Court explained, “[the 
intellectually disabled] do not act with the level of moral culpability that 
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”159 Atkins may 
have committed the worst crime, but he was not in the category of the 
worst offenders. As such, he was not among the worst of the worst for 
whom death was appropriate. 
Based on Atkins—what it said about the intellectually disabled 
having diminished moral culpability applies with full force to the severely 
mentally ill too—there is good reason to think that the state’s interest in 
retribution is not legitimate when it comes to executing the severely 
mentally ill.  But if that is true, then I am back to my question: what is it 
that we get out of it when we execute the severely mentally ill?  
I have a view—a fear actually—and I am going to share it. It comes 
from Ford, the case in which the Supreme Court first held that executing 
the insane was unconstitutional (and then did next to nothing to stop 
it).160 In Ford, the Court paused to consider what purpose the state could 
possibly have in executing the insane in the first place, and its observation 
as to the answer is one that I have always found deeply disturbing, 
haunting even. It was what the Court called “the barbarity of exacting 
mindless vengeance.”161  
Mindless vengeance. It fits all too well in the context of executing the 
severely mentally ill. It is vengeance, a dark twist on retribution,162 and it 
                                                     
term “intellectually disabled.” Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (2010) 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1140(2)(A) (2012)). 
157  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. 
158  See id. at 307 (recognizing that defendant Atkins was sentenced to death for his 
conviction of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder). 
159  Id. at 306. 
160  See supra notes 135–141 and accompanying text.  
161  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
162  For a discussion of the difference between retribution, which is viewed as a 
legitimate penological purpose, and vengeance, which is not, and an argument that the two 
are not so different after all, see Corinna Barrett Lain, The Highs and Lows of Wild Justice, 
50 TULSA L. REV. 503, 515 (2015) (“Revenge, social scientists tell us, involves the emotional 
pleasure of retaliating past wrongs by making the offender suffer. Retribution can embody 
that concept, but it can also embody the closely related principle of just deserts, which aims 
to restore some sense of balance by imposing punishment proportional to the wrong 
committed. One is about retaliation, the other about restoration, but the distinction is a thin 
reed. The restorative principle at work in just deserts is the talion—an eye for an eye, life 
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is mindless. It is mindless in the sense of recognizing the lack of full 
mental capacity of the offender, and it is mindless in the way that states 
have shown no interest in recognizing the reduced culpability of the 
severely mentally ill. Blood has been shed and a price must be paid; the 
victim must be avenged, no matter how pathetic the offender. As the 
Supreme Court in Ford recognized, there is indeed a barbarity in that 
endeavor, which leads me to my last point.  
III. WHAT EXECUTING THE SEVERELY MENTALLY ILL SAYS ABOUT US  
The fact that we execute the severely mentally ill in this country 
might seem bizarre to outsiders, but it (unfortunately) makes more sense 
when considered in the larger death penalty context. Here, I am reminded 
of what Henry Schwarzchild, who led the ACLU’s Capital Punishment 
Project in the early 1970s and later founded the National Coalition to 
Abolish the Death Penalty,163 once said about the death penalty. He wrote:  
[W]e have always picked quite arbitrarily a tiny handful of people among those 
convicted of murder to be executed, not those who have committed the most 
heinous, the most revolting, the most destructive murders, but always the poor, 
the black, the friendless, the life’s losers, those without competent, private 
attorneys, the illiterate, those despised or ignored by the community for reasons 
having nothing to do with their crime. . . . The penalty of death is imposed almost 
entirely upon members of what the distinguished social psychologist Kenneth B. 
Clark has referred to as “the lower status elements of American society.”164  
If you spend any time at all studying the American death penalty, you 
know this to be true. It was true back in 1972, when the Supreme Court 
invalidated the death penalty for the very reason that this was true.165 It 
was true in 1976, when the Court reinstated the death penalty under the 
promise that it would no longer be true.166 And it is true today. The reality 
of the death penalty is that it is not for the worst of the worst. It is for the 
weak among the worst—the most vulnerable capital offenders in a variety 
                                                     
for a life—and that is also what gives rise to the anticipated emotional satisfaction of 
revenge. In that sense, retribution and revenge are just two sides of the same coin; what the 
state does as retribution, the victim experiences as revenge.”). 
163  For a more detailed description of Schwarzchild’s work in this area, see HERBERT 
H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 61–62 (1996), https://ebookcentral-proquest-
com.ezproxy.regent.edu/lib/regent-ebooks/detail.action?docID=270937. 
164  Henry Schwarzchild, In Opposition to Death Penalty Legislation, in THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA 364, 366–67 (Hugo Adam Bedau 3d ed. 1982). 
165  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (holding that the imposition 
of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment); id. at 240, 255–57 (Douglas, 
J., concurring) (reasoning that the death penalty amounts to a cruel and unusual 
punishment because it is imposed discriminatorily—selectively being applied to the poor, 
suspect classes, and unpopular minorities—thereby violating the equal protection clause, 
which is implicit in the ban against such punishments).  
166  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (holding that the concerns in 
Furman regarding the discriminatory imposition of the death penalty may be addressed 
through a precisely worded statute).  
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of ways—and executing those with severe mental illness is just Exhibit A 
for my claim.  
What, then, does this say about us? As Bryan Stevenson told the 
Justices during his oral argument in the Madison case, “[T]he Eighth 
Amendment isn’t just a window. It’s a mirror.”167 It says something about 
us as a society. 
What, then, does it say that not a single death penalty state in the 
Union exempts the ultimate punishment for the severely mentally ill? Not 
one.168 Since 2006, the American Psychological Association, the American 
Psychiatric Association, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness have 
opposed the death penalty for mentally ill offenders.169 The ABA has 
likewise issued a statement saying these people are seriously sick; they 
are not the worst of the worst murderers and should not be executed.170 
One observer noted, “[T]o my knowledge, this is the very first time in 
history that those four organizations have adopted the same position on 
anything.”171 People paying attention, people in the know—they find this 
indefensible. And by and large, we don’t defend it.  We don’t need to; it is 
just what we do. What does that say about our thirst for “exacting 
mindless vengeance”?172  
Over 150 years ago Dostoyevsky wrote, “The degree of civilization in 
a society can be judged by entering its prisons.”173 Justice Kennedy quoted 
                                                     
167  Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 60. 
168  See generally ELIZABETH DAVIS & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU 
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170  AM. BAR ASS’N, RECOMMENDATION 122A: MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION pmbl. 
(2006), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ 
death_penalty_moratorium/mental_illness_policies.authcheckdam.pdf.  
171  See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 37, at 8. 
172  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986). 
173  THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 210 (Fred R. Shapiro ed. 2006) (reproducing a 
translation of a portion of Fyodor Dostoyevski’s The House of the Dead). 
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this language in a 2015 concurrence and added, “There is truth to this in 
our own time.”174 At the time, Justice Kennedy was writing about how we 
treat those on death row,175 but those words are also true when it comes 
to who we put on death row in the first place.  
Maybe, just maybe, the facts of Madison will be over the line; maybe 
the Supreme Court will finally say that a state has gone too far. But, in 
my mind, we should have never come this close to the line in the first 
place. To do so says more about our moral failings, our barbarity, than it 
says about those who we execute.  
Thank you. 
 
**Editor’s note: Subsequent to this keynote speech, the Supreme Court 
decided Madison, holding that in evaluating competency to be executed, a 
court must look not at the diagnosis, but rather at its downstream 
consequence—namely, whether it precluded the inmate from having a 
rational understanding of why the state wants to execute—and remanded 
for the court to determine that in the first instance under the clarified 
standard. See Madison v. Alabama, 139 S.Ct. 718 (2019). 
                                                     
174  Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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